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This paper presents a dynamic model that analyzes how firms’ expectations with regards to 
technological change influence the demand for outsourcing. We show that outsourcing 
becomes more beneficial to the firm when technology is changing rapidly. As the pace of 
innovations in production technology increases, the firm has less time to amortize the sunk 
costs associated with purchasing the new technologies. This makes producing in-house with 
the latest technologies relatively more expensive than outsourcing. The model therefore 
provides an explanation for the recent increases in outsourcing that have taken place in an 
environment of increased expectations for technological change. We test the predictions of 
the model using a panel dataset on Spanish firms for the period 1990 through 2002. The 
empirical results support the main prediction of the model, namely, that all other things equal, 
the demand for outsourcing increases with the probability of technological change. 
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  Outsourcing, or the contracting out of activities to subcontractors outside the firm, 
has become more widespread in recent decades. For example, Magnani (2006) reports 
that the cost share of purchased services in U.S. manufacturing industries grew from 
4.4% in 1949 to 12% in 1998. Similar increases in outsourcing have been observed in 
Europe as well.
1 A large theoretical literature has examined the determinants of the 
decision to outsource, or, more generally, the organization of production. Outsourcing 
parts of the production of a final product is costly because of the costs associated with 
searching and finding an appropriate input supplier and, more importantly, because 
contracting with outside suppliers may be imperfect if some attributes of the outsourced 
inputs are not verifiable by third parties. This limits contracting possibilities and creates a 
potential hold-up problem.
2 These ideas go back to Williamson (1975, 1985) and 
Grossman and Hart (1986) and have been recently incorporated into industry equilibrium 
models by Grossman and Helpman (2002) while their implications for international trade 
are analyzed in Antras and Helpman (2004). 
In this paper we present a dynamic model that analyzes how firms’ expectations 
with regards to technological change influences the demand for outsourcing – an issue 
not addressed in previous models – while abstracting from other considerations (e.g., 
transaction costs, specificity, etc.). We show that outsourcing becomes more beneficial to 
the firm when technology is changing rapidly.  A firm can buy the latest technology and 
                                                 
1 See Arndt and Kierzkowski (2001), Mol (2005) and Abramovsky and Griffith (2006). 
 
2 Baker and Hubbard (2003) consider how information technology in the trucking industry impacts 
contracting possibilities and vertical integration. Baccara (2007) uses a general equilibrium model to study 
how information leakages could affect a firm’s outsourcing decision as well as its investments in R&D. 
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produce intermediate inputs in-house. Firms incur a sunk cost when adopting new 
technologies.  Outsourcing, on the other hand, enables the firm to purchase inputs from 
supplying firms using the latest production technology while avoiding the new 
technology sunk costs. The intuition behind the model is that as the pace at which 
innovations in production technology arrive increases, the less time the firm has to 
amortize the sunk costs associated with purchasing the new technologies. This makes 
producing in-house with the latest technologies relatively more expensive than 
outsourcing, The model, therefore,  provides an explanation for the recent increases in 
outsourcing that have taken place in an environment of increased expectations for 
technological change. 
We test the predictions of the model using a panel dataset on Spanish firms for the 
period 1990 through 2002. This dataset is particularly useful for our purposes because, in 
each survey year, the firms were asked whether they contracted with third parties for the 
manufacturing of custom-made finished products or parts. In addition, the dataset 
contains information on the firm’s R&D expenditures, an ideal proxy for expected 
technological change.  Our econometric analysis controls for unobservable fixed 
characteristics of the firms and also uses instrumental variables techniques to deal with 
the potential endogeneity of our technological change measure. The empirical results 
support the main prediction of the theoretical model, namely, that all other things equal, 
the demand for outsourcing increases with the probability of technological change. 
Ours is the first paper to provide both a theoretical and empirical analysis of the 
impact of technological change on outsourcing using firm-level panel data. Magnani 
(2006), using industry-level data for the U.S., found that outsourcing was facilitated by 
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technological diffusion, while Abramovsky and Griffith (2006) found that information 
and communications technology-intensive firms in the U.K. were more likely to purchase 
a greater amount of services on the market. Other research has found evidence that firms 
engage in outsourcing in response to unpredictable variations in demand (Abraham and 
Taylor, 1996), to take advantage of the specialized knowledge of suppliers (Abraham and 
Taylor, 1996), and to save on labor costs (Autor, 2003; Diaz-Mora, 2005; and Girma and 
Gorg, 2004).
3   
  Part II presents a dynamic model of the relationship between outsourcing and 
expected technological change.  Part III discusses the data and empirical specifications 
used to test the predictions of the model. Results are presented in Part IV. Part V 
concludes. 
II.   A Model of the Demand for Outsourcing 
A firm produces a profit-maximizing amount of output y using a single input x.  
The model focuses on determining how to procure a given level of input x. There are two 
ways of obtaining x. One way is to produce x in-house using k machines each with 
productivity θ according to the in-house production function  
xk θ =             ( 1 )  






⎛⎞s = + ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
 
                                                 
3 Other researchers (Ono (2007) and Holl (2007)) have studied the effect of agglomeration economies on 
outsourcing.  For empirical studies of the impacts of outsourcing on wages and productivity, see Feenstra 
and Hanson (1999), Amiti and Wei (2006), Gorg, Hanley and Strobl (2007), and  Gorg and Hanley (2007).  
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where pk is the (rental) price of a machine and s is a sunk cost associated with installing 
and using the machines of a given productivity (or vintage) for the first time.  s is 
incurred only once. This initial installation cost also reflects training costs. 
The second way of procuring x is to buy it in the market. We call this outsourcing 
production. The cost of this alternative is  
O Cp x =  
where p is the unit price of x. 
We assume that outsourcing costs are the same across firms, but allow for 
heterogeneity in the sunk cost of in-house production by assuming that s is distributed 
among firms with distribution G(s). 
Assuming constant returns to scale in production we can, without loss of 








⎛⎞s = + ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
=
      ( 2 )  
As in Ono (2000), the firm chooses the procuring alternative that minimizes costs. 
Let   1 χ =   indicate a firm that outsources its production.
4 This simple model implies 
                                                 
)
4 The constant returns to scale assumption implies that the firm either produces all y in-house or 
outsources all of y, therefore it is not optimal to split a given level of  y between in-house and outsourcing. 
The cost of splitting y between in-house ( H y   and outsourcing    is   () O y ( ) ,
k p
OH pyy θ s + +   where  
  We can write this cost as   . OH yy y =+ ( ) .
k p
H pyp ys θ − −+   It follows that producing all of y in-
house minimizes costs when  
k p p θ >   , i.e., when outsourcing is expensive, and, conversely, outsourcing 
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( ) 1 if 
0 else
k p
OH CC sp y θ
χ
⎧ ≤⇔ > −
⎪ ⎪ = ⎨
⎪
⎪ ⎩
     (3) 
Suppose the price of x is above the marginal cost of in-house production.
5 Firms 
would then outsource only because the sunk cost of in-house production is relatively 
large; firms with low sunk costs will not outsource production. A larger production size 
decreases the likelihood of outsourcing because the sunk cost per unit of production 
decreases. Notice that if we do not allow for heterogeneity in s then all firms of a given 
size would be either outsourcing or producing in-house which is in general contrary to the 
facts.
6
Introducing Technological Change 
We extend this simple model of demand for outsourcing to allow for 
technological change in the production of x.  Our goal is to examine the relationship 
between technological change and outsourcing. Since technological change is uncertain 
and occurs over time, we now introduce dynamics and uncertainty into the model. We 
focus, for simplicity, on a two-period model. 
                                                                                                                                                 
k p p θ <
k p p θ = all of y is preferred when     . Only when     is the firm indifferent between in-house and 
outsourcing all or parts of its production. In reality, however, firms usually outsource part of their 
production, so that we should interpret x as one of multiple component of the final output produced by the 
firm. 
5If the suppliers of x have a cost advantage in producing x and there is competition among suppliers the 
price of x could be below the marginal cost of in-house production. In this case, all firms will outsource x. 
6 We could have also added heterogeneity to the cost of outsourcing. The model would be equivalent 
because heterogeneity enters additively and what matters for the decision to outsource is the difference 
between   and  O C H C . In this case s may represent the additional cost of using a standardized input which 
is absent when x is produced in-house because then the firm can perfectly tailor the input to its specific 
needs.  
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Suppose that technology (i.e., the productivity of machines) in the first period is given by  
1. θ   In the second period, productivity can either increase to   22 1 ,, θ θθ >   with probability  
λ   or remain at   1 θ   with the complementary probability, i.e., 
2
1
 with probability 








At the beginning of each period, the firm decides to outsource or to produce in-
house given the observed technology level and prices. We denote the price of x in period 
1 by   1. p   We assume that x is supplied by firms using the latest technologies. As 
production technology improves, firms can charge a lower price of x and still make 
profits. Whether they will do this or not depends on the competitive environment. We do 
not model the supply side here but allow the price of x to change as technology improves. 
We let  p2  be the price of x when a technological change occurs in the second period, 
and  p2   be the price of x when technology does not change. Because the price of 
machines does not change, their quality-adjusted price  
k p
θ   declines as technology 
improves. 
We proceed backwards. Suppose there is technological change in the second 
period. The firm faces three alternatives: it can outsource, it can produce in-house with 
the old technology or it can pay the sunk cost and upgrade to the new vintage of 
machines. To simplify the analysis we make the assumption that upgrading always 
dominates keeping the old technology. This requires a not too large sunk cost, namely  
( )
21
12 , k sp y
θθ
θθ
− ≤   which we assume to hold, i.e., 









1 2 1 ) (
θ θ
θ θ
y p s for s G k      (4) 
In this case, the firm’s decision is essentially as in the static model analyzed in the 
previous section: to outsource or to produce in-house. Because producing in-house 
requires incurring the sunk cost, the firm’s decision in the first period does not affect its 
current decision. Then, as in (3), when there is a technological improvement, the demand 






k p sp y λ θ
χ
⎧ ≥−
⎪ ⎪ = ⎨
⎪
⎪ ⎩
     (5) 
If there is no technological change, the firm’s decision depends on its outsourcing 
decision in the first period. If the firm produced in-house in the first period, it already 
paid the sunk cost s for the use of the technology and therefore it will outsource only if  
1 2 .
k p yp y θ >   But, if the firm outsourced in the first period, the cost of using the old 
technology in-house is  
1
k p ys θ +   which needs to be compared to the cost of outsourcing,  
2 . p y   This gives the following outsourcing decision in period 2 in the absence of 






k p sp y θ χ
χ
⎧ ×≥ −
⎪ ⎪ = ⎨
⎪
⎪ ⎩
     (6) 
Because of the presence of sunk costs, the decision to outsource during the first 
period affects future decisions if technological change does not occur. Specifically, a firm 
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that did not outsource during the first period,   1 0, χ =   will be less likely to outsource 
during the second period if no technological change occurs. 
In the first period, the firm chooses to outsource or produce in-house by 
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where β   is the discount factor. 
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1
k p s θ  (7) 
We can rule out the first case because it is reasonable to assume that the price of x  
in period 2 (the last period) cannot be below the marginal cost of in-house production, 








≥        ( 8 )  
The firm decides to outsource in the first period whenever   11 ( 1) ( 0) 0. CC χ χ = −= <   
The decision to outsource in the first period therefore depends on current and future 
prices of x as well as on the size of sunk costs and the probability of technological change  
   ,








1  if  (1 )  and 



























                                                
   (9) 
From (7) we see that, all other things equal, an increase in λ decreases the cost of 
outsourcing relative to that of in-house production making the firm more likely to decide 
to outsource in the first period. This is the main message of the model: when the 
likelihood of technological change increases, firms will be more reluctant to purchase the 
technology to produce in-house because it will soon be obsolete. Upgrading the 
technology involves incurring a sunk cost “di novo.” The more frequent the innovations 
arrive, the less time the firm has to amortize these sunk costs. The firm can use 
outsourcing to obtain x from supplying firms using the latest technology and avoid the 
sunk costs. 
 
7This assumption depends on the type of technology and competition among the firms producing x. 
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Empirical Implications 
We use this simple model of the demand for outsourcing to generate a reduced-
form equation for the demand for outsourcing in any period. 
There are three different threshold values in (9) that determine the demand for 
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. Because demand for outsourcing depends on s being above or 
below these thresholds, their relative magnitudes are important. Among the different 
ways these three thresholds can be ranked, only two configurations are feasible, namely,  





















































which can we written more compactly as  





























( ) 1 1











  defines two price regions which determine demand for 
outsourcing in the first period, 
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Notice that, for given prices,  1( G ) − ⋅   increases with λ so that the demand for 
outsourcing in period 1 is increasing in the probability of technological change λ. 
The demand for outsourcing in period 2 is given by  
() ( )
() ( ) ( ) ( )
22 2
22 1 1 22 1 1
|1
1 | 0, 1 ( ) | 0, 0 1 ( )
EE T
ET E ET E
χλ χ
λχ χ χ χ χ χ
==
+− = = + = = − ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦
 
where T2 is an indicator for technological change occurring in period 2. 
In this simple model,   ( 22 1 |0 ,0 ET χχ ) 0 = ==   because a firm that did not 
outsource in the first period will continue producing in-house in the second period if θ 
does not change. Expected outsourcing demand in the second period is therefore 




EG p y G p y λ 1 ( ) E χ λλ
θθ
⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞
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Given prices,   2 () E χ   is an increasing function of λ when the price margin after 
an innovation occurs,  
2 2 ,
k p p λ θ −   is no larger than the price margin when there is no 
technology change,  
1 2 .
k p p θ −   This sufficient condition is likely to hold under many 
market structures because the number of potential outsourcers is larger after an 
innovation occurs prompting supplying firms to lower their markups in order to capture a 
larger market share. 
III. Data and Empirical Specification 
  We use the Encuesta sobre Estrategias Empresariales (ESEE, or Survey on 
Business Strategies), a panel of approximately 1800 Spanish manufacturing companies, 
surveyed annually since 1990. Data are currently available through 2002. The survey is 
conducted by the Fundacion SEPI with the support of the Ministry of Industry, Tourism 
and Trade. We use data from the 1990, 1994, 1998 and 2002 surveys.
8
  In each survey, the firms were asked if they contracted with third parties for the 
manufacture of custom-made finished products or parts, and if so, the value of the 
outsourced products or parts.  We use this information to create two indicators of 
outsourcing, a dummy for whether or not the firm did engage in outsourcing, and  the 
value of outsourcing divided by total costs.
9 Table 1 shows, by industry sector and 
overall, the percentage of firms that reported outsourcing at least some part of production 
during the 1990–2002 time period and the mean value of the outsourced production as a 
                                                 
8 Budgetary constraints prevented us from purchasing data for all of the years between 1990 and 2002. 
9 Lopez (2002) describes the evolution of outsourcing of services and of production in Spanish 
manufacturing firms using a sub-sample of the ESSE data for the period 1990-1999. He finds significant 
differences in outsourcing between small and large firms and a positive effect of outsourcing on 
productivity.  
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percentage of total cost.  On average, 41% of firms reported that they outsourced 
production during this time period. The outsourcing percentage rose from 35% in 1990 to 
43% in 2002.  There is significant variation in the likelihood of outsourcing across 
industries ranging from a low of 16% for Drinks to a high of 61% for Machinery and 
Mechanical Goods. The value of the outsourced production as a percentage of total costs 
is approximately 5 percent during this time period; for firms that did outsource 
production, the mean value of outsourced production as a percentage of total costs is 11 
percent. 
  In the previous section, we derived the demand for outsourcing in period t as a 
function of the probability of technological change, output, and the various input prices 
and technology parameters. Notice that the demand function differs between periods 1 
and 2 because of the dynamic nature of the problem and the finiteness of the model. We 
will ignore this issue in the empirical application because we implicitly assume that the 
data-generating process has been going on for some time so that the relationship between 
outsourcing and its drivers stabilizes over time. Under the assumption that input prices 
and technology parameters are common to all firms in an industry, these can be captured 
by industry dummies (ID). Thus,  
() ( ,, ) tt Eh y I D t χ λ =       ( 1 1 )  
Equation (11) is a reduced-form expression because all the arguments in the h function 
are exogenous in the model.
10 The main implication of the theoretical model is that, all 
                                                 
10Equation (10) is a dynamic equation that could also serve as the basis for estimating the relationship 
between outsourcing and λ. It is, however, specific to a 2-period model. In a model with 3 or more periods 
the dynamics are much more complicated. We therefore prefer to estimate reduced form equations. 
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other things equal, the demand for outsourcing increases with the exogenous probability 
of technological change λ.  
In order to test this implication we need a proxy for λ.  We will proxy λ by an 
binary variable indicating whether a firm engages in R&D, and if it does, we will also use 
the amount of R&D expenditures. The rationale for this proxy is that a firm that engages 
in R&D is more likely to experience technological change (new processes and/or new 
products) as compared to a firm that does not engage in R&D. Table 1 shows that during 
the time period under study, 36 percent of the firms in the sample engaged in R&D, with 
this percentage ranging from a low of 13% for Editing and Printing to 67% for 
Chemicals. 
We make separability and linearity assumptions on the function h, 
it
j
ij j it y it r it u ID y r + + + = ∑δ β β χ      ( 1 2 )  
where  rit is our measure of R&D (a dummy for being engaged in R&D and/or the ratio of 
R&D expenditures to sales) and  1 ij ID =   if firm i is in industry j and zero otherwise. By 
using the two measures of  rit we are able to study whether the extensive or the intensive 
margin of R&D is more important in explaining outsourcing.  We will estimate this 
equation for all years using clustered standard errors at the firm level to account for 
heteroskedasticity and arbitrary serial correlation.  
Although the model assumes λ to be exogenous, a serious concern is that the 
probability that the firm will experience technological change is determined by 
unobserved factors that also affect the decision to outsource. More innovative firms may 
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be doing more R&D and may also be adopting new production methods that require more 
outsourcing, i.e., λ, or its R&D proxy, may be endogenous in the outsourcing equation. 
The estimated R&D coefficient will therefore not capture the causal effect of 
technological change on outsourcing. We address this concern by allowing for a time-
invariant component in uit to affect both the decision to engage in R&D (and therefore λ) 
and the decision to outsource, i.e.,  it i it u µ η = + . Consistent estimates under this 
assumption can be obtained from time-differencing equation (12) 
( ) ( ) 1 1 1 1 − − − − − + − + − = − it it it it y it it r it it y y r r η η β β χ χ    (13) 
and estimating this equation by OLS period by period. These estimates are consistent 
provided R&D is strictly exogenous.  
The strict exogeneity assumption is quite strong because it precludes any 
correlation between shocks that affected outsourcing in previous periods and current 
R&D expenditures. We therefore make a weaker assumption that allows for outsourcing 
to affect future R&D expenditures, 
0 ,...) , | ( 1 = − it it it r r E η       ( 1 4 )  
Under this assumption, we can use the lag of R&D as an instrument for   in 
equation (13) to obtain consistent estimates of the parameters.   
1 − − it it r r
Equation (12) includes, in addition to the proxy for technological change, the 
firm’s annual sales (Sales) as well as a vector of industry dummies. We also add two 
variables that measure the firm’s current technological intensity, whether it uses 
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computerized digital machine tools (comp_dmt) or uses robotics (comp_robotic). 
11  
In order to control for factors other than technological change that may contribute 
to outsourcing, we also include a set of variables that have been the focus of previous 
research on the determinants of outsourcing. Since firms may use outsourcing as a way of 
economizing on labor costs (see Abraham and Taylor, 1996), we include the firm’s 
average labor cost defined as total annual spending (wages and benefits) on “staff” 
divided by total employment (wage). Outsourcing may also be used to smooth the 
workload of the core workforce during peaks of demand (Abraham and Taylor, 1996; 
Holl, 2007). Hence, we add a measure of capacity utilization (capacity) defined as the 
average percentage of the standard production capacity used during the year. Small firms 
would be expected to be more likely to outsource because it may not be optimal for them 
to carry out all steps in the production process because of the costs of maintaining 
specialized equipment or skills in-house (Abraham and Taylor, 1996). Hence we control 
for the size of the firm using four categories for number of employees. Another factor 
that can increase the propensity to outsource is the volatility in demand for the product 
(Abraham and Taylor, 1996; Holl, 2007). We control for this by adding dummy variables 
for whether the main market the company serves expanded (market_expand) or declined 
(market_decline) during the year. It has also been argued that older firms are more likely 
to outsource because they have had time to learn about the quality and reliability of 
potential subcontractors (Holl, 2007). We therefore include the age of the firm (age). 
Whether the firm primarily produces standardized products or custom products should 
also affect the propensity to outsource with firms focusing on product variety being more 
                                                 
11 These two variables may also be correlated with technological change and their inclusion in the equation 
  17 
likely to outsource some of their production; we therefore add a dummy variable 
indicating that the firm produces standardized products that are, in most cases, the same 
for all buyers (std_product). Finally, we control for the firm’s export propensity, the 
value of its exports divided by its sales (export), and whether the firm has any foreign 
ownership (foreign_own). Both of these factors have been included in prior studies of 
outsourcing (Girma and Gorg, 2004; Diaz-Mora, 2005; and Holl, 2007).  
IV. Results 
  We estimated Equation (12) using two dependent variables: whether or not the 
firm engaged in outsourcing and the value of the firm’s outsourced production as a 
percentage of total costs. Results for the first dependent variable are shown in Table 2 
and for the second in Table 3. Each table provides the coefficients on the R&D dummy 
using various approaches to estimating Equation (12). The coefficients on the other 
variables included in these regressions are shown in Appendix Tables A-1 and A-2. 
  Columns (1), (2) and (3) in Table 2 use OLS, probit and logit, respectively, to 
estimate Equation (12). We find remarkably similar results across these three columns; 
firms that engage in R&D are 11-12 percent more likely to outsource some part of their 
production. When we control for firm-specific time-invariant unobservable factors in 
Column (4), firms that engage in R&D are 9.5% more likely to outsource production. 
Using first-differences in column (5), the coefficient on R&D falls to 0.066 but is still 
very significant. Column (6) adds the R&D/sales ratio and we find that what matters is 
whether the firm engages in R&D, not its R&D-intensity. Finally, in column (7), we use 
                                                                                                                                                 
could weaken the measured effect of the R&D variable. 
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the first lag of R&D as an instrument for the growth rate of R&D.
12 Although the 
coefficient on R&D is no longer significant because of the doubling of the standard error, 
the magnitude of the coefficient is virtually identical to the coefficient reported in column 
(5).  
The results in Appendix Table A-1 show that, in the cross-section, high wage 
firms, older firms, larger firms, firms that are in a product market that has experienced an 
increase or a decrease (as compared to no change), firms that use computerized digital 
machine tools or robotics, are all more likely to outsource. Foreign-owned firms are less 
likely to outsource. These results, however, change dramatically when we use fixed 
effects or first differences: none of these additional regressors are significant while the 
R&D variable remains significant.
13  
  In Table 3, the dependent variable is the value of the outsourced production 
divided by total costs. Since 60 percent of the observations are zeroes, we use tobit 
regressions. The results in the first column indicate that the probability of outsourcing is 
9 percent higher for firms that engage in R&D; this effect is very close to the results 
observed in columns (1), (2) and (3) in Table 2. Column (1) in Table 3 also shows that, 
for firms that do outsource, the ratio of outsourcing to total costs is 0.013 higher for firms 
that engage in R&D. Using the mean value of the dependent variable for firms that do 
outsource (see Table 1), the coefficient translates to an 11 percent increase in 
outsourcing. The regressions in Table 3 were also estimated using standard random 
                                                 
12 We also tried using the first lag of the growth rate in R&D as an instrument and obtained very similar 
results – but less precise -- to those reported in column (7). 
13The exception is the export propensity variable which is positive and significant in the fixed effects and 
first differences specifications, but not significant in the first differenced regression with IV.   
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effects tobit, a method of random effects tobit that controls for unobserved effects
14, and 
instrumental variables tobit.  Although the impact of R&D on outsourcing is smaller 
using random effects, the coefficients are still significant. The results using IV tobit are 
very strong; the coefficients on R&D are significant for both the extensive and the 
intensive margins of outsourcing.  
V. Conclusions 
  A large theoretical literature has examined the determinants of the decision to 
outsource, or, more generally, the organization of production. But previous models have 
ignored the role played by technological change.  In this paper we present a model that 
fills this void. We show that outsourcing becomes more beneficial to the firm when 
technology is changing rapidly.  The intuition behind the model is that the more 
frequently innovations in technology arrive, the less time the firm has to amortize the 
sunk costs associated with an obsolete technology. Outsourcing enables the firm to 
purchase from supplying firms that are using the latest technology and avoid the sunk 
costs. Our model, therefore, links technological change and outsourcing and explains why 
outsourcing has been increasing in recent decades when the pace of technological change 
has accelerated. 
  We test the predictions of the model using a panel dataset on Spanish firms for the 
time period 1990 through 2002. Our econometric analysis controls for unobservable fixed 
characteristics of the firms and also uses instrumental variables techniques to deal with 
the potential endogeneity of our technological change measure. The empirical results 
                                                 
14We follow the Chamberlain-like approach suggested in section 8.2 of Chapter 16 in Wooldridge (2002) 
and include the means (over time) of all the regressors to account for the correlation between the regressors 
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indicate that firms doing R&D are between 6 and 10 percent more likely to outsource 
than firms not engaged in R&D. This is consistent with the main prediction of the 
theoretical model that the demand for outsourcing increases with the probability of 
technological change. Interestingly, while the existing literature has found evidence that 
other variables play a role in the decision to outsource, we find no such evidence here 
when accounting for firm effects.   
                                                                                                                                                 
and the unobserved firm effects. 
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Industry Proportion of Firms Proportion of Firms
Outsourcing Production Engaging in R&D
All If >0
Meat-processing industry 0.162 0.008 0.045 0.213
Foodstuffs and tobacco 0.242 0.019 0.080 0.279
Drinks 0.161 0.023 0.138 0.342
Textiles 0.451 0.061 0.134 0.244
Leather and footware 0.339 0.050 0.147 0.222
Wood industry 0.291 0.033 0.116 0.140
Paper 0.296 0.024 0.080 0.343
Editing and Printing 0.56 0.076 0.137 0.130
Chemicals 0.388 0.025 0.066 0.669
Rubber and plastics 0.458 0.038 0.083 0.366
Non-metallic minerals products 0.258 0.021 0.081 0.325
Iron and steel 0.284 0.023 0.082 0.555
Metallic Products 0.463 0.053 0.112 0.280
Machinery and mechanical goods 0.613 0.098 0.161 0.530
Office machinery, computers, processing, 0.589 0.059 0.100 0.617
Electrical and electronic machinery 0.578 0.062 0.107 0.540
Motor vehicles 0.521 0.065 0.128 0.592
Other transport material 0.588 0.089 0.155 0.444
Furniture 0.367 0.041 0.113 0.216
Other manufacturing industries 0.503 0.050 0.098 0.287
All Industries (1990-2002) 0.412 0.047 0.114 0.364
1990 (N=2189) 0.351 0.042 0.120 0.340
1994 (N=1876) 0.416 0.044 0.107 0.364
1998 (N=1776) 0.467 0.054 0.117 0.381
2002 (N=1708) 0.429 0.048 0.112 0.375
Value of Outsourcing
Divided by Total Costs
Mean Values of Outsourcing and R&D, By Industry Sector (1990-2002)
Table 1















































R&D/Sales           0.0483 
(0.5979) 
 





0.13 0.10 0.10    0.006  0.007   
LR(chi
2)       78.57      14.23 




a Dependent Variable: dummy variable equals one if firm outsourced some of its production; zero otherwise. All 
regressions include year dummies, industry dummies, and the set of control variables listed in the text. The complete 
regression results are given in the Appendix. Huber-White robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
b Coefficients shown in columns (2) through (7) are the marginal effects calculated at the mean.  
 
* Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%.  
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Table 3 
The Impact of R&D on Share of Outsourcing Expenditures in Total Costs, 1990-2002
a
 
   Random Effect Tobit  IV
c




Marginal effects for the 














Marginal effects for the 
expected value of 
outsourcing expenditures 
















        
Observations  6825 
 
6825 6825  3970 
Number of groups   3077  3077   
a Dependent Variable: Value of outsourcing divided by total costs.  All regressions include year dummies, industry 
dummies and the set of control variables described in the text. The complete regression results are shown in the Appendix. 
Huber-White robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
bSee Wooldridge (2002), p. 540 for a discussion of unobserved effects Tobit models. This regression includes means over 
time of independent variables. 
c The instrument used for the R&D dummy is its one period lag. 
* Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%.  
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Appendix Table A-1 
Dependent Variable: The likelihood of outsourcing 
Full Regression Estimates of Regressions (3), (4), (5) and (7) in Table 2 
   Logit Logit  Fixed  Effect First  Dif.  First Diff. & IV 
variable  dy/dx  Std. Err. dy/dx  Std. Err. coef.  Std. Err. coef.  Std. Err.
RandD dummy  0.1215*** 0.01780.0949*** 0.03280.0663***  0.02269 0.0472 0.0617
Year dummy 1994  0.0610*** 0.01600.0779*** 0.0246           
    1998  0.0986*** 0.01750.1479*** 0.0391      0.0303*** 0.0111
    2002  0.0472*** 0.01880.1092*** 0.0357           
sales 0.0000  0.00000.0000  0.00000.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
product_standard -0.0215  0.0175-0.0486  0.0351-0.0292  0.0238 -0.0364 0.0291
foreign_own -0.045**  0.0221-0.0022  0.04860.0169  0.0371 -0.0116 0.0450
export_propensity 0.0275  0.03600.1587*  0.08500.1162*  0.0618 0.0320 0.0774
If using computer digital machine tools  0.0296*  0.01530.0161  0.02400.0018  0.0177 -0.0169 0.0217
If using robotic  0.0360*  0.01950.0029  0.02980.0071  0.0220 -0.0074 0.0254
age 0.0024*** 0.0010                 
age
2 -0.0000*  0.0000                 
Employees:  21-50  0.0501*** 0.0213-0.0120  0.04670.0000  0.0000 -0.0358 0.0401
   51-200  0.0457  0.02780.0330  0.0675      -0.0317 0.0693
  201-500  0.1076*** 0.03070.0639  0.0744      -0.0344 0.0852
  501+  0.1008*** 0.03930.0998  0.0760      -0.0756 0.1018
wage 0.0031*** 0.0008-0.0006  0.0016-0.0011  0.0014 -0.0015 0.0016
market_expand 0.0525*** 0.01540.0268  0.02140.0225  0.0161 0.0057 0.0185
market_decline 0.0329*  0.01820.0325  0.02540.0172  0.0184 0.0199 0.0234
capacity 0.0003  0.00050.0002  0.00070.0003  0.0005 0.0000 0.0007
Industry Dummies (omitted: Meat-
processing)                         
Foodstuffs and tobacco  0.0991  0.0661                 
Drinks -0.0882  0.0833                 
Textiles 0.3663*** 0.0523                 
Leather and footware  0.2773*** 0.0648                 
Wood industry  0.2109*** 0.0709                 
Paper 0.1170  0.0822                 
Editing and Printing  0.4187*** 0.0465                 
Chemical industry  0.1520**  0.0687                 
Rubber and plastics  0.3051*** 0.0596                 
Non-metallic minerals products  0.0888  0.0699                 
Iron and steel  0.0144  0.0786                 
Metallic Products  0.3302*** 0.0559                 
Machinery and mechanical goods  0.4027*** 0.0488                 
Office machinery, computers, processing,  0.3665*** 0.0607                 
Eletrical and electronic machinery and m  0.3623*** 0.0536                 
Motor vehicals  0.2763*** 0.0645                 
Other transport material  0.3666*** 0.0611                 
Furniture 0.2824*** 0.0629                 
Other manufacturing industries  0.3832*** 0.0577                 




Appendix Table A-2 
Dependent Variable: Share of Outsourcing Expenditures in Total Costs 
Full Regression Results for Table 3 
         Random Effect tobit     
   tobit  standard  unobserved effects IV tobit 
Variable  coeff.  Std. Err. coeff.  Std. Err. coeff.  Std. Err. coeff.  Std. Err.
RandD dummy  0.0434***  0.0074  0.0117  0.0031  0.0081  0.0042  0.0439  0.0186 
Year dummy 1994  0.0137***  0.0066  0.0003  0.0029  -0.0058  0.0044  -0.017**  0.0078 
    1998  0.0309***  0.0069  0.0095*** 0.0031  -0.0003  0.0072       
    2002  0.0140*  0.0076  0.0036  0.0032  -0.0114  0.0101  -0.0257*** 0.0079 
sales 0.0000**  0.0000  0.0000*** 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000***  0.0000 
product_standard -0.0022  0.0077  -0.0001  0.0030  -0.0065  0.0047  -0.0053  0.0074 
foreign_own -0.0235*** 0.0083  -0.0091** 0.0039  -0.0052  0.0071  -0.0323*** 0.0091 
export_propensity 0.0163  0.0157  0.0116*  0.0063  0.0294**  0.0114  0.0119  0.0146 
If using computer digital machine tools  0.0073  0.0063  0.0018  0.0026  0.0014  0.0034  0.0071  0.0071 
If using robotic  0.0105  0.0074  0.0024  0.0033  0.0001  0.0043  0.0172**  0.0083 
age 0.0004  0.0003  -0.0001  0.0001  0.0010  0.0010  0.0003  0.0004 
age
2 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Employees:  21-50  0.0169*  0.0096  0.0031  0.0036  0.0025  0.0037  0.0118  0.0096 
   51-200  0.0090  0.0117  0.0001  0.0047  -0.0006  0.0048  -0.0015  0.0119 
  201-500  0.0220*  0.0124  0.0025  0.0052  0.0017  0.0056  0.0017  0.0146 
  501+  0.0149  0.0154  -0.0050  0.0065  -0.0063  0.0073  -0.0083  0.0173 
wage 0.0014***  0.0003  0.0005*** 0.0001  0.0004  0.0002  0.0017***  0.0004 
market_expand 0.0241***  0.0062  0.0080*** 0.0026  0.0054*  0.0031  0.0154**  0.0074 
market_decline 0.0093  0.0073  0.0030  0.0031  0.0060  0.0037  0.0089  0.0089 
capacity 0.0000*  0.0002  0.0002**  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0006**  0.0002 
Industry Dummies (omitted: Meat-processing)                      
Foodstuffs and tobacco  0.0403*  0.0242  0.0118  0.0101  0.0129  0.0101  0.0154  0.0250 
Drinks 0.0103  0.0362  0.0133  0.0139  0.0140  0.0140  0.0004  0.0349 
Textiles 0.1795***  0.0249  0.0556*** 0.0101  0.0579***  0.0101  0.1696***  0.0243 
Leather and footware  0.1387***  0.0291  0.0424*** 0.0121  0.0458***  0.0122  0.1152***  0.0294 
Wood industry  0.1006***  0.0296  0.0280**  0.0126  0.0295**  0.0126  0.0771**  0.0314 
Paper 0.0609*  0.0316  0.0090  0.0125  0.0112  0.0126  0.0581**  0.0294 
Editing and Printing  0.2053***  0.0268  0.0658*** 0.0112  0.0691***  0.0114  0.1804***  0.0265 
Chemical industry  0.0606**  0.0247  0.0101  0.0109  0.0106  0.0110  0.0438*  0.0262 
Rubber and plastics  0.1239***  0.0250  0.0265**  0.0112  0.0288**  0.0113  0.1101***  0.0266 
Non-metallic minerals products  0.0468*  0.0257  0.0097  0.0107  0.0103  0.0107  0.0195  0.0260 
Iron and steel  0.0197  0.0302  0.0055  0.0124  0.0077  0.0125  0.0109  0.0292 
Metallic Products  0.1489***  0.0242  0.0429*** 0.0104  0.0462***  0.0105  0.1153***  0.0253 
Machinery and mechanical goods  0.2088***  0.0262  0.0769*** 0.0108  0.0792***  0.0109  0.1783***  0.0258 
Office machinery, computers, processing,  0.1530***  0.0293  0.033**  0.0142  0.0343**  0.0142  0.1349***  0.0338 
Eletrical and electronic machinery and m  0.1540***  0.0251  0.0394*** 0.0110  0.0405***  0.0111  0.1390***  0.0265 
Motor vehicals  0.1355***  0.0263  0.0394*** 0.0116  0.0423***  0.0119  0.1093***  0.0276 
Other transport material  0.1905***  0.0322  0.0778*** 0.0142  0.0834***  0.0145  0.1543***  0.0312 
Furniture 0.1274***  0.0276  0.0333*** 0.0112  0.0355***  0.0112  0.1074***  0.0271 
Other manufacturing industries  0.1583***  0.0286  0.0405*** 0.0133  0.0428***  0.0134  0.1110***  0.0297 
Mean values of:                 
RandD              0.0075  0.0062       
sales              0.0000**  0.0000       
product_standard              0.0103*  0.0062        
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foreign_own              -0.0055  0.0086       
export_propensity              -0.0271**  0.0136       
If using computer digital machine tools              0.0007  0.0054       
If using robotic              0.0044  0.0067       
age              -0.0012  0.0010       
age
2             0.0000  0.0000       
employment              0.0000  0.0000       
wage              0.0001  0.0003       
market_expand              0.0079  0.0056       
market_decline              -0.0078  0.0066       
capacity              0.0002  0.0002       
constant -0.3022*** 0.0312  -0.0242** 0.0121  -0.0292*  0.0157  -0.248***  0.0320 
* Significant at 10%.  **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%           
 